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BURDENS OF PROOFt
Flem;ng James, Jr.*
T HE term "burden of proof" is used in our law to refer to two
separate and quite different concepts. The distinction was not
clearly perceived until it was pointed out by James Bradley Thayer
in 1898.1 The decisions before that time and many later ones are
hopelessly confused in reasoning about the problem.2 The two distinct
concepts may be referred to as (1) the risk of non-persuasion, or the
burden of persuasion or simply persuasion burden; (2) the duty of
producing evidence, the burden of going forward with the evidence,
or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.3
RIsK OF NON-PERSUASION OR PERSU.SION BURDEN
Burden of proof often means what Wigmore has called the risk of
non-persuasion. Wherever in human affairs a question of the existence
or non-existence of a fact is to be decided by somebody, there is the
possibility that the decider, or trier of the fact, may at the end of his
deliberations be in doubt on the question submitted to him. On all the
material before him, he may, for example, regard the existence or non-
existence of the fact as equally likely-a matter in equipoise. If, now,
the trier is operating under a system which requires him to decide the
question one way or the other, then to avoid caprice that system must
furnish him with a rule for deciding the question when he finds his
mind in this kind of doubt or equipoise. Where the parties to a civil
action are in dispute over a material issue of fact, then that party who
will lose if the trier's mind is in equipoise may be said to bear the risk
t This article will appear as part of a forthcoming text on procedure by Professor
James, to be published by Little, Brown & Co. The author gratefully acknowledges
the able assistance rendered by Stephen L. Dinces, third year student, Yale Law School.
*Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., 1925, LL.B., 1928, Yale University.
Member, Connecticut Bar.
1. TH-r,, A PRELimInARY T.AnsE o. EVIDENCE AT THE Co.Mo.N LAW 355-64
(1898) [hereinafter cited as TA'ER].
2. See generally McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of
a Burden of Persaasion 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955).
3. See M ORGA.% SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-A.MERICAN SYSTErA OF
LMG.ATion 72-73 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN].
4. 9 WVIGMoRE, EvIDENcE 5 2485 (34 ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited "s \ VicOREJ.
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that the trier will not be affirmatively persuaded or the risk of non-
persuasion upon that issue."
What Wigmore has called the risk of non-peisuasion"is more often
called the burden.of persuasion or the persuasion burden.6 Under our
system. which frees the judge and jury of responsibility for investigating 7
and presenting facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely
upon the respective parties, the more common phraseology is apt
enough. The risk may well be viewed as a burden which the party may
take affirmative and dynamic steps to bear. It should be noted, however,
that even under a system where the trier of fact had the job of in-
vestigating the facts without help or argument from the parties there
would still be the possibility of doubt or equipoise when the time for
decision came. A concept of the risk of non-persuasion seems to be
inseparable from any system wherein issues of fact are to decided on
any rational basis by human beings.
Many civil cases are tried by a court without a jury; in them the
judge acts as trier of fact as well as law. As trier of fact he may be
faced with the problem of doubt or equipoise upon one or more issues.
Vhere that is the case the judge must meet and resolve the problem
and he-does so under our system by applying the same guides or tests
as wciuld be laid down for a jury if it were deciding the issue.'
Where an issue of fact is tried to a jury, it is the members of the
jury whose minds may be in doubt or equipoise and the judge is not
directly concerned in solving the problem. Under our system, however,
the court does not leave this problem entirely to the jury, but attempts
to formulate guides or tests for them in-its charge.9 Moreover courts
have devised different'tests or measures of persuasion to be applied to
different types of cases or issues. All this has meant:
(1) The court allocates the persuasion burden on"'each issue and
thereby "decides each issue of fact which the jury is unable to decide"; 0
that is he tells them what to do in case they cannot decide it.
5. Moa.A N 74.
6. See MomAN 72-73.
7. MoRGAN 71-72; Michael & Adler, Real Proof, 5 VA.,D. L. Rav. 344 (1952).
8. See, e.g., Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grasso, 186 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1951); Lecates
v. Lecates, 38 Del. 190, 190 Ad. 294 (1937).
9. "[T]he most important part of the judge's charge relativ6 to the ficts-i.e. that
of dealing with the burden of proof-ought to be. so worded that the jurors can com-
prehend it." Larson v. Jo Ann Cab Corp., 209 F.2d 929, 935" (2d Cir. 1954).
10. MoRG AN 71.
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(2) The court has tried to retain a measure of control over the
jury's mental processes by describing for them the required measure of
persuasion.
.(3) To do so courts have had to formulate expressly these measures
and tests and this had -led to refinements-often overrefinements-of
language, and to many reversals, that might have been avoided had the
court, as trier, applied the test without the need for making it articulate.'1
The usual formulation of the test in civil cases is that there must be
a preponderance of evidence in favor of the party having the persuasion
burden (the proponent) before he is entitled to a verdict.'2 An alterna-
tive phrase often used is greater weigt of the evidence. The general
statement (in either form or both, coupled in the alternative as "pre-
ponderance or greater weight of the evidence") is usually explained as
referring not to the number of witnesses or quantity of evidence but
to the convincing force of the evidence.'3
This common form of statement has been criticized as calling for an
objective appraisal of the evidence rather than a subjective appraisal
of its persuasive effect on the mind of the trier.14 As a perceptive writer
pointed out, "perception of the preponderance of evidence is quite
consistent with want of belief." "I
'All would agree that what counts is the jury's belief in the existence
(or non-existence) of the disputed fact, and the extent to which the
evidence actually produces that belief; surely we are not seeking the
jury's estimate of the weight of evidence in the abstract, apart from its
power actually to convince or persuade them.'" Moreover it is doubtful
11. A judge may of course feel the need to articulate the test with analytical detail
in his finding or memorandum of decision, but this rarely happens.
It may be urged that the lack of formulation may sometimes conceal error, so that the
need for formulation would be a good thing. But oftener, I suggest, it is better to
apply a common sense test without articulation than to have to frame the test in
language which will satisfy appellate courts. The gist of the concept is not so hard
to grasp and apply practically in most cases that the law should insist on its being
carefully thought through every time it is used.
12. See MINDRm , EvIDo-cE CoMMO.V Sas & Cosmxmo LAW 180 (1947) [herein-




15. 9 ArIG IORE § 2498, at 327. quothig Professor William Trickett. "To detect a
preponderance of evidence that B signed a note, is neither to believe that he signed




whether such abstract weighing can be done (except quantitatively as
by counting noses). For these reasons a more meaningful and accurate
statement would require the jury to believe that the existence of a fact
is more probable than its nonexistence before. they may find in favor
of the party who has the burden to persuade the trier of the fact's
existence.' 7 Some courts accept this formulation of the test; 8 others
have balked at it.' 9
Most if not all courts accept the usual formulation of the test,20 and
it is probably unlikely in fact to mislead a jury into making the difficult
and abstract evaluations which the language literally invites. Indeed
that meaning of the words used in describing the preponderance of
evidence test would probably never occur t6 the average juryman,
whose tendency will always be to interpret the charge in a personal
and subjective way-in terms of his own feelings and experiences.
Another quite different question is whether the preponderance of
evidence test (however phrased) is to be applied to all types of -civil
actions'and to all issues in them.2' A much stronger degree of conviction
or belief is, of course, required in criminal cases. There the burden is to
show the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.2 Such a test
is scarcely ever applied to issues in civil actions. Yet courts have devised
an intermediate test which is occasionally applied in civil controversies.
This calls for "clear and convincing .evidence" or evidence which is
"clear, precise and indubitable," before the proponent's persuasion
burden is met.' These formulations show the same confusion as that
17. See generally Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof, 47 HARv. L. Rzv. 59, 66 (1933).-
18. See, e.g., Sargent v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 307 Mlass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940);
Sullivan v. Nesbit, 97 Conn. 474, 117 Ad. 502 (1922).
19. See Lampe v. Franklin Am. Trust Co, 339 Mo. 361, 384, 96 S.W.2d 710, 723
(1936).
20. See Annot., 147 A.L.R. 380 (1943).
-21. See MAGUIRE 179.
22. This rule is frequently codified. See, e.g., CAL PEN. CoDE S 1096; IND. AN-.
STAT: S 9-1806 (1956). See generally McBaine. Burden of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv.
242 (1944).
23. Beeler v. American Trust Co, 24 Cal. 2d 1. 147 P.2d 583 (1944) (whether deed
intended as mortgage); Clark v. Diefendorf, 109 Conn. 507, 147 Ad. 33 (1929) (claim
against decedent's estate not presented to her during her lifetime); Johnson v. John-
son;"172 N.C. 530, 90 S.E, 516 (1916) (to have written deed -corrected because of
mutual misfake of parties). See-also United-States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S.
224. 262 (1897) (to avoid a patent for fraud; evidence must be "clear. convincing and
satisfactory"); Bukowski v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D. Tex. 1955)
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noted above between an objective measurement of the weight of proof
and its persuasive effect on the mind of the trier. But they probably
suffice to put the jury more in a frame of mind to resist persuasion than
does the usual test, and it is doubtful whether anything more can be
done where a difference in degree is sought in dealing with factors so
subjective and imponderable.
BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE
The second meaning which is commonly given to the term burden
of proof refers to the burden of going forward with, or of producingevidence. This is sometimes called the burden of evidence or the pro-
duction burden. Here again, as with the persuasion burden, a more
accurate term might be the risk of non-production, but this expression
is not in general use.
A definition of the term is not so important as a description of the
function and operation of the concept it embodies. Moreover the
definition Will be easier to understand in such a context, so the attempt
to frame it will be postponed.
The production burden first comes into play at the very beginning of
the trial.24 We have seen that the judge and jury do not have the re-
sponsibility of investigating cases or furnishing the evidence upon which
they are to be decided. Our system leaves it to the parties to do those
things. If, now, neither party offers any evidence at the trial, what will
happen? The answer is that one party loses. He may, therefore, be
said to bear the risk of this consequence of non-production of evidence.25
Or, as we more often say, he bears the burden of producing at least
some evidence.
The next question is: how much evidence need the original proponent
produce to lift this burden - -6 The answer may be divided into two
parts: (a) The proponent must introduce sufficient evidence to justify
a verdict in his favor, (b) on each of the propositions of fact which
he must establish as part of his case."T This answer does not get us very
(where income tax penalties are sought, fraud must be established by "clear and con-
vincing proof"); 9 VIGMoRE § 2498.
24. See THAYER 376.
•25. See THAYER 357, 376. See also 9 WIGIOaRE S§ 2487-88.
26. See diagram in 9 NIMoRE § 2487. See generally McNaughton, s-upra note 2,
at 1384-85.




far; it simply invites further inquiry and refers us to the concept :of
sufficiency of the evidence and the test for determining what proposi-
dons of fact constitute essential elements of the proponent's case rather,
than the case of his adversary-that is the tests for allocating the pro-
duction burden on each issue of fact in the case. These tests are dis-
cussed later in this article; the concept of sufficiency of the evidence will
be treated in a later article28
We have seen that the consequence of failure to produce evidence-
or sufficient evidence-is loss of the case. This loss is brought about by
means of the procedural device of nonsuit, directed verdict, or dis-
nissal.29 Each of these is an order made by the court either on motion of
a party or on its own motion after the proponent has rested his case, i.e.
has indicated that he has put in all the evidence upon the issue which he
intends to-which may of course be no evidence at all.
Since it is the judge who passes upon such motions, it is the judge who
determines questions of the sufficiency of evidence and who allocates
the production burden on each issue.30 Thus these concepts may be
viewed as part of the apparatus for controlling the jury.zl The court
screens all cases initially to see whether they will even go to the jury. 2
We may next consider the consequences of the proponent's meeting,
or lifting, the production burden. In the first place the proponent thereby
escapes a nonsuit, directed verdict, or dismissal when he rests his case.
But is he entitled to more, for example, a directed verdict in his favor?
He will not be, of course, if the opponent puts in controverting evi-
dence as he usually does. But what if the opponent also rests his case
at this point without putting in any evidence? Even then the proponent
is not generally entitled to a directed verdict; the opponent is entitled
to have the jury pass on the proponent's evidence. 3 Testimony, even
28. To be published in the March, 1961 issue of Virginia Law Review.
29. Thoe v. Chicago M. & St. P.R.R., supra note 28; 9 igmore S 2495.
30. See MAGuiRE 175-76; 9 ,VIGIoRE S 2495.
31. 9 WiGmoRE S 2487. See also 2 HARPER & JANEs, TORTS K§ 15.1-.5, 17.1-.6, 19.11.
(1956); THAYER 183-262; James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases,
58 Y. L.J. 667 (1949).
32. MAGum= 175.
33. See, e.g, Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913); Terwilleger v. Marion.
222 S.C. 185, 72 S.E.2d 165 (1952); George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, .287
N.Y. 108, 119-23, 38 N.E.2d 455, 459-63 (1941); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Roberts. 135 Tex. 123, 139 S.,V.2d 80 (1940) (plaintiff not entitled to favorable finding
as matter of law on ismue upon which he gave uncontradicted testimony-jury may
disbelieve* him); cf. Hughes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 261 S.,V.2d 942 (Mo. 1953) (affirma-
tive-defense supported by uncontradicted testimony for jury).
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if uncontradicted, usually raises questions of credibility (i.e., honesty,
bias, accuracy of observation, memory, expression and the like)."'
Circumstantial evidence usually permits more than one possible in-
ference.35 Admitted conduct may often be evaluated differently (as
reasonable, negligent, or the like) by different persons.36 All of these
matters are properly for the jury. When the evidence upon an issue is
in such state that it is for the jury, then neither party has the production
burden on that issue, although of course the opponent is free to put his
evidence before the trier of fact.
So much for the usual case. It will sometimes happen, however, that
the proponent's evidence leaves open no question of credibility, of
evaluation of conduct, or of choice among competing inferences, about
which reasonable minds might differ. In such a case the court will
direct the verdict in favor.of the proponent unless the opponent offers
evidence to controvert or avoid the effect of the proponent's evidence.3 7
At this point the production burden rests on the party who was
originally the opponent. The original opponent then may meet this
burden by offering evidence which either (a) presents a question for
the jury, so that the production burden rests on neither party, or (b)
is of such compelling force as to shift the production burden back
again to the party who bore it at the outset-the original proponent.
From the above, the following appears:
(1) The concept of the production burden is addressed to the
court's function, not the jury's. It is simply a device whereby the court
determines whether, if the trial were stopped at any given point, it
would send the case to the jury. If not, the court decides the case and
the jury has no role to play. If the case is sent to the jury, the produc-
tion burden drops out of the case and has no role to play.38 The jury
will be concerned only with the persuasion burden.39
34. See, e.g., INvatr v. Moran, 81 R.I. 399, 103 A.2d 801 (1954) (trial court need
not accept uncontradicted evidence showing gift inter vivos); Terwilliger v. Marion,
supra note 33; MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R, 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944)
(defendant's uncoatradicted evidence exculpating its employees for derailment pre-
sents issue for jury).
35. See Mahan v. Able, 251 S.W.2d 994, 997 (Ky. 1952); George Folds, Inc. v. City
of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 119-23, 38 N.E.2d 455, 459-63 (1941).
36. See Sams r. .lbers Super Mkts., Inc., 86 Ohio App. 167, 89 N.E.2d 101 (1949);
2 HARPRa & JA -. ToRTs SS 15.3, 16.10, 17.1 (1956); James, supra note 31, at 676-79.
37. MAGUIRE 175-76: 9 AWNoGORE S 248.7.
38. 9 WVIGNtORE . 2487.
" 9.. IORrc, " 73: 9 WIGN.MORE 5 2487.
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(2) The question of allocation of the production burden arises at
the very beginning of the trial and at various points thereafter. And
while this burden rests on one party at the beginning, it may shift to
his opponent, and then shift back again.40
(3) The concept has primarily a procedural consequence when
evidence is available to both parties on the issue in question; it simply
determines the order in which they shall put it in. Where, however,
no evidence is available to a party on an issue, then the allocation to
him of the production burden will mean that he loses upon that issue,
and often upon the whole case. Thus in an action for wrongful death
caused by negligence where there is no evidence, direct or circum-
stantial, of the decedent's own conduct leading up to his death, plaintiff
cannot recover under a system which allocates to him the production
burden on the issue of contributory negligence.4
(4) The concept of a production burden will be fully applicable
in cases tried to a judge without a jury, although the jury trial has
probably pointed up and dramatized its importance. Under a system
in which the tribunal itself or some other agency of society had the
responsibility for acquiring the materials for decision on its own initia-
tive, however, there would be no need to allocate the production burden
to one of the parties.
THE BASES FOR ALLOCATING THE BURDENS OF PROOF
There is no satisfactory test for allocating the burden of proof in
either sense on any given issue.42 The allocation is made on the basis
of one or more of several variable factors. Before considering these,
however, we should note three formal tests which have some currency
but are not very helpful.43
(1) It is often said that the party who must establish the affirmative
proposition has the burden of proof on the issue.44 But language can be
manipulated so as to state most propositions either negatively or affirma-
40. See, e.g., Smith v. Hill, 232 Mass. 188, 122 N.E. 310 (1919), aff'd, 260 U.S. 592
(1923).
41. Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151 Atl. 433 (1930).
42. "Where the burden of proof should rest is merely a question of policy and
fairness, based on experience in the different situations." Rustad v. Great No. Ry.,
122 Minn. 453, 456, 142 N.W. 727, 728 (1913), quoting 9 WIGIORE S 2486, at 275.
43. Compare MAGmRE 179.
44. First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 118, 216 Pac. 691, 693 (1923); 1 GR..1-
LEA1k, EvrDENcE S 74 (16th ed. 1899); MoRGAN 75; THANER 370, 485; 9 VIGNMORE 5 2486.
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tively. Breach of a promise may be call non-fulfillment. Negligence is
often described as the lack of or failure to exercise due care. An action
in which plaintiff seeks a declaration of non-liability is just as truly one
seeking a declaration that good defenses exist to the claim asserted by the
defendant.4 5
(2) It is sometimes said that the burden of proof is upon the party
to whose case the fact in question is essential, and so it is," but this
test simply poses another question: to which party's case is the fact
essential? And the second question is no easier to answer than the first;
indeed it is but a restatement of the same question.
(3) It is often said that the party who has the burden of pleading
a fact must prove it.47 This is in large part true and where there is
clear authority on the pleading rule this is a fairly good, though not
infallible, indication that the rule of burden of proof will parallel it.
Three things should, however, be noted. The burden of proof does
not follow the burden of pleading in all cases.18 Many jurisdictions for
example require a plaintiff to plead non-payment of an obligation sued
upon but do not require him to prove it.49 In federal courts defendant
must plead contributory negligence as an affirmative defense to an action
for injuries negligently caused, but federal courts in diversitv of citizen-
ship cases will follow a local rule which puts on plaintiff the burden of
proving his freedom from contributory negligence.50 The second dif-
ficulty with the suggested test is that there is often no clear authority
45. Compare Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grasso, 186 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1951) (burden
of proof in declaratory judgment action on insured defendant), and State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.'v. Smith, 48 F. Supp. 570 (W.D. Mo. 1942) (defendant has burden of
proof of showing liability), with American Indem. Co. v. Davis, 155 F. Supp. 47
(M.D. Ga. 1957), modified, 260 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1958) (plaintiff insurer has burden of
proof of breach of cooperation clause), and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Drumheller, 25 F.
Supp. 606 (W.D. Mo. 1938) (burden on plaintiff to prove insured did not die as re-
sult of accident). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judg-
ments-1941-1949, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 787, 836 (1949).
46, MORGcA 75; THAYER 371 & n.2; 9 'VIGM.NOR 2486.
47. MORGAN 75. See also CULuC, CASES ONr MODERN PLEADING 628 (1952); C ,
CODE PLEAD1 607 (2d ed. 1947).
. 48. See THAaER 366-67.
. 49. See Thomas v. Tygart, 177 Ark. 1195, 6 SAV.2d 827 (1928); Alden, The De-
feuxe of Payment Under Code Procedure, 19 YALE LJ. 647 (1910); Reppy, The
Anomaly of Payment as an Affirmative Defense, 10 CoR-NELL L.Q. 269 (1925). But cf.
Conkling v. 'Weatherwax, 181 N.Y. 258, 73 N.E. 1028 (1905) (action to enforce legacy
as lien on realty is not based on instrument for payment of money. so burden of
proving nonpayment is on plaintiff).
50. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943).
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upon the pleading rule. The. burden of pleading is itself allocated on
the basis of pragmatic considerations of fairness, convenience, and policy,
rather. than on any general principle of pleading.' Since the burden
of proof is allocated on very much the same basis, a similar inquiry must
be made to determine the pleading rule (where there is no clear au-
thority) as would suffice to answer the burden of proof rule in the first
instance. This fact, incidentally, suggests why burden of pleading and
burden of proof are usually parallel; they are both manifestations of the
same or similar considerations.5 2 A third difficulty with the proposed
rule is that under modem systems, pleadings are cut off with the
answer so that issues often have to be tried that do .not appear in the
pleadings at all.
Another rule for allocating the burden of proof would put it on the
party having the readier access to knowledge about the fact in ques-
tion. 4 This, it will be noted, is not merely a formal rule. It refers rather
to one of the considerations which should and do in fact influence the
allocation of the burden of proof.5 5 But it is not the only consideration
and it is by no means always controlling. It is an everyday occurrence
in litigation that a party has the burden to prove what his opponent's
conduct was. Examples are negligence, contributory negligence, and
breach of contract, in many common situations. In these instances the
consideration arising from greater access to evidence is overcome by a
feeling that a charge of wrongdoing should in fairness be proven by the
party making it.
Another factor to be considered is the extent to which a party's
contention departs from what wvould be expected in the light of ordinary
human experience. It is a matter of convenience to assume that things
51. See CLAI, CAsEs ON MoDERN PLEADING 610 (1952).
52. It also shows why they are not always parallel. In suing on an insurance policy
for example, many states allow a plaintiff to allege compendiously that he has per-
formed all conditions precedent (these being many). See Rochon v. Preferred Acc.
Ins. Co, 118 Conn. 190, 171 Atl. 429 (1934). Defendant must then plead specifically
the nonfulfillment of any conditions which it will rely on. But plaintiff has the
burden of proving fulfillment of any conditions thus specifically set out in the de-
fendant's pleadings. The pleading rule here serves a consideration of convenience,
namely the avoidance of pleading at length the performance of manifold conditions
as to most of which there will probably be no issue. But this consideration is fully
satisfied at the pleading stage and has no place among those which should determine
burden of proof.
53. See, e.g., FED. R. civ. P. 7(a); N.Y. Cmy. PRAc. AcT S§ 260, 272, 274.
54. MAGUIRE 179: MORGAN. 75 n.98; 9 WIGMORE § 2486.
55. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS ; 19.9 (1956).
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occurred as they usually do and to make the party who asserts the
uncommon occurrence prove that it did happen as he claims. Thus
where services are performed for another in an ordinary business or
professional context, it is unlikely that they were understood to be
gratuitous. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the burden of
proving such an understanding is on the one who claims it.S6 By way of
contrast, where services are performed for other members of the im-
mediate family, living together, the likelihood of an agreement to pay
for them is not so great and must be proved by. him who claims the
right to be paid."
Substantive considerations may also be influential. For real or sup-
posed reasons of policy the law sometimes disfavors claims and defenses
which it nevertheless allows. Where that is the case procedural devices
like burden of proof are often used as handicaps, to use Judge Clark's
felicitous phrase, against the disfavored contention.' s Thus whoever
charges his adversary with fraud, be he plaintiff or defendant, must
prove itY9 And although falsity is often included in the definitions of
defamatory statements, yet the defendant in libel or slander must plead
and prove the truth of the objectionable words if he would use that
as a defense.60 In many of the older states, plaintiff, in a negligence
action, had to prove his own due care, but as the defense of contributory
negligence became increasingly unpopular with courts and legislatures,
the tendency has been increasingly to make defendants plead and prove
it.The degree of persuasion required is also sometimes manipulated as
a handicap against disfavored contentions. Thus if a claim is presented
against a decedent's estate which was never presented to the decedent
himself during his lifetime, some courts require the claim to be proven
by clear and convincing evidence.6'
Except for the last paragraph, no distinction has so far been made
56. See In re Smith's Estate, 202 Okla. 302, 213 P.2d 284 (1949); Hartley v. Bohrer,
52 Idaho 72, 11 P.2d 616 (1932); Scott v. Morse, 54 Iowa 732, 6 N.V. 68 (1880).
57. See Johnson v. Johnson, 99 N.H. 392, 111 A.2d 820 (1955) (claim allowed
where agreement to pay affirmatively proven); In re Fox's Estate, 131 W. Va. 429,
48 S.E.2d 1 (1948) (agreement to pay not proven); cf. Annor, 7 A.L.R.2d 8 (1949);
Annot., 36 A.L.R. 677 (1925).
58. CrLAM, CODE PLEADING 609-10 (2d ed. 1947).
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. See Clark v. Diefendorf, 109 Conn. 507, 147 Ad. 33 (1929); Badover v. Guaranty
Trust & Say. Bank, 186 Cal. 775, 200 Pac. 638 (1921).
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in this section between the two kinds of burden of proof. That is be-
cause the kind of factors we have been treating are considered in al-
locating either kind of burden. When we deal with a specific allocation
and the time for making it, however, we must differentiate. We have
seen that the question of production burden comes up at the very be-
ginning of the trial and thereafter when both parties rest their case; and
we have also seen that the burden may shift. This means that the
balance of considerations relevant to allocating this burden may be
struck several times during the course of a trial. And considerations
which are relevant at one time, on the then state of the evidence, may
become irrelevant or may be outweighed at a later point in the trial.
The orthodox notion, emanating from Thayer, was that the persuasion
burden never shifted from its original allocation.0 2 This would mean
that the persuasion burden does not accompany the production burden
which may shift, although generally the persuasion burden is on the
party who bore the production burden at the beginning of the trial. Even
this last statement is not always true. It may well be considered fair, for
instance, that the government should bear the burden of persuading, the
jury that an accused was sane when he did the act charged as a crime, yet
considerations of convenience may dictate a rule compelling the accused
to offer evidence of insanity before the defense will be submitted to the
jury at all. s
Thayer was clearly right in pointing out that the production burden
and the persuasion burden did not always march hand in hand. 4 Con-
siderations which may be proper in determining the order of proof
may deserve less weight, or none, in determining how the jury is to be
guided in its ultimate deliberations. Administrative convenience, for
example, would generally be more important where order of proof is
all that is at stake, and rules of thumb which serve such convenience
may be justified in this context while they would be arbitrary in the
other.
It is by no means equally clear, however, that the persuasion burden
should never shift. Surely there is no inherent reason why the original
allocation should not be reconsidered when the case finally goes to
the jury, on all the factors which are seen to be relevant at that time.
Moreover, as Morgan points out, there is no need to make any allocation
62. THA-Mi 370, 378.
63. See Davis v. United States, 160 US. 469, 485-87 (1895).
64. See THAaER 370-78.
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of the persuasion burden at the beginning of the trial or at any other
time unless and until-the production burden on every dispositive issue
is out of the case and the issues are submitted to the jury,6 5 so that all
talk of shifting the persuasion burden is beside the point. And surely
the considerations relevant at the time of final submission should de-
termine how the persuasion burden is to be placed, and not those which
appeared to be relevant at an earlier time if they are different. In spite
of the cogency of Morgan's reasoning, Thayer's formulation of the rule
is the one most frequently stated.6
PRESUMPTIONS
The word "presumption" is used to mean many different things, 67
but this they all have in common: they involve a relationship between a
proven or admitted fact or group of facts, A, and another fact or con-
clusion of fact, B, which is sought to be proven.
At one end of the scale is the presumption of law, or conclusive or
irrebuttable presumption. If A is shown, then B is to be presumed
without question and the court will not even receive evidence or enter-
tain argument to show the non-existence of B. And the court will
direct a jury that if they find A to be proven they vust also find B.
The conclusive presumption is not really a procedural device at all.
Rather it is a process of concealing by fiction a change in the substantive
law. When the law conclusiveiy presumes the presence of B from A,
this means that the substantive law no longer requires the existence of B
in cases where A is present, although it hesitates as yet to say so forth-
rightly.6 We shall not here deal further with conclusive presumptions.
Our concern is with those often called rebuttable presumptions of fact.
The word presumption is occasionally used to refer to the logical
inference of one fact from the existence of another. 9 The process of
judicial proof is constantly calling on circumstantial evidence and the
65. See MomA.- 80.
66. See, e.g., Cornell v. Cornell, 57 N.M. 380, 258 P.2d 1143 (1953); 9 WGMORE
§ 2489 (burden of proof never shifts).
67. See MORGAN, MAI.'RF & WFINsmi'x, CASES ON EvIDorcE 438-39 (4th ed. 1957).
68. See 9 WIGMNIORE § 2492; Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Preswanpqons of
Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307, 311-12 (1920). See- also
State v. Platt, 2 S.C. 150, 154 (1870); TnA AR 317, 319. .
69. See Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Higgins, 150 F.2d 536, 538 n.2 (2d Cir. 1945);
State v. Corby, 28 N.J. 106, 113-15, 145 A.2d 289, 293-94 (1958) (citing 9 IVIG.IORE
2491). See also Bohlen, supra note 68, at 310.
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inferences which may be drawn from it. If Smith mails at a postbox
a letter to Jones, with proper address and postage on the envelope, the
frier may infer that Jones received the letter.7° From long skid marks on
a'pavement great speed on the part of the vehicle that made them may be
inferred.71 From the blowing of a horn in certain circumstances it may
be inferred that a driver then saw a pedestrian.72 From handwriting
similarities identity of authorship of two documents may be inferred.73
And so on, ad infinitum. As we shall see, courts set limits to the drawing
of inferences and will permit juries to draw only those which the courts
consider rational. But if a court determines that B is a rational inference
from A, then the trier of fact is free to draw that inference as a matter
of.general lay reasoning and persuasion without the aid of any special
procedural rules pertaining to litigation. Since there are such special
rules, jsince the word "presumption" is often used to refer to them,
and since "inference" is the word generally used to refer to the process of
drawing conclusions of fact on the basis of general lay reasoning and
experience, it serves clarity and avoids confusion to observe this dis-
tincticin between these two words.74
Many careful courts and writers use the word presumption to refer
only to a device for allocating the production burden v.7  It operates
thus: If B is presumed from A, then on a showing of A, B 7ntst be as-
sumed by the trier in the absence of evidence of non-B. To .put it
another way, if A is shown, then the party who asserts non-B has the
production burden on the issue of B vel nonz, i.e., B's. existence or non-
existence. The word "presumption" wvvill be used here only *in this way.
In some situations, to be sure, B may be the only rational inference
from A (absent further evidence), and we have seen that in all such
cases the production burden shifts under rules of general application.
But courts and legislatures have created presumptions in cases where
70.'See, e.g., Hobart-Farrell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Klayman, 302 Mass. 508,
19 N.E.2d 805 (1939); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Brantley, 231 Ala. 554, 165 So. 834
(1936); Williams v. Northeast Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 51 S.V.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932); 9
WNVIIoRE S 2519.
71. See Stubbs v. _llen, 168 Wash. 156, 10 P.2d 983 (1932); Akers v. Epperson,
172 S.W.2d 512 (tex. Civ. -App. 1942); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 112,"125 (1952).
72. $ee Carney v. Coicord St. Ry., 72 N.H. 364, 369, 57 Ad. 218, 221 '(1903)
(trolley bell).
74.. See Flickema v. Henry Kraker Co, 252 Mich. 406, 2 3 NAV. 362 (1930).
74. Se' M.AGU I 183; 9 zNibmoaPY_ 5 2491.
75. See O'Dea v. Amihodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 At. 486 (1934); MORGAN 77; 9
WIGMORE !! 2490-91: Bohlen, qtpra note 68.
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either (1)'B would be a permissible inference from'A, but not the only
permissible one,70 or (2) B would not even be a permissible inference
from A. 77 In such situations a presumption has ani artificial procedural
force and effect (at the point where proponent rests his case) oVer and
above the logical probative effect of the evidence. In the first situation
just described a presumption would call for a directed verdict on the
issue of B vel non, 718 if the opponent also rests, while, as we have seen,
without the presumption the proponent on that issue would be entitled
only to have it go to the jury 9 In the second situation the presumption
has a double effect. It protects the proponent from an adverse directed
verdict on the issue (or non-suit or dismissal), which he would otherwise
suffer for want of suffidient evidence."" It also entitles the proponent to
a directed verdict in his own favor on the issue, absent any countervail-
ing evidence. Later in this article we shall inquire whether a presump-
tion may have any further, continuing effect after evidence to rebut it
has been introduced.
From the above it appears that a presumption may have important
consequences. What, then, are the bases upon which courts or. legis-
latures will create presumptions? For the most part they are the same
kinds of reasons that influence the allocation of the production burden
generally, and these may be summed up as reasons of convenience,
fairness, and policy.8' What is likely, for instance, is often presumed.
Most men are sane, as the law reckons sanity, and most properly sent
letters reach their destination. In the absence of any evidence pointing
to an opposite conclusion in the case at hand, it is both convenient and.
76. See, e.g., authorities cited note 70 supra. See also McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla.
334, 5 So. 2d 867 (1942) (that stop sign was erected by proper authority); 9 WIGMoRE
S 2515 (presumption of ownership from possession).
77. Cox.,. Gasv. STAT. Rav. S5 52-182 to -183 (1958) (presumption of agency be-
tween owner and operator of automobile); see O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170
Ad. 486 (1934).
78. See Sellers v. Quails, 206 Md. 58, 110 A.2d 73 (1954); In re Padjan Estate,
340 Mich. 277, 65 N.W. 2d 743 (1954); Ritchie v. Thomas, 190 Ore. 95, 105, 224 P.2d
543, 547 (1950); MommAs 76-77.
79. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
80. See THAYER 336; cf. O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 Ad. 486 (1934);
MORGAM 77.
81. See MAGUIRE 185-86; text accompanvinig notes 42-60 supra.
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fair to assume that this testator, or this man accused of crime" was sane
when he made the will or did the act charged as criminal; or that this
properly mailed letter reached the addressee.84 If nothing else, these
assumptions will save a lot of time and trouble in making ponderous
proof in every case of matters which will be controverted in only a
small minority of cases.
Access to evidence is often the basis for creating a presumption.
When goods are damaged in a bailee's possession, for instance, the bailee
can more easily find out what happened to them than the bailor, so it
is fair to presume the bailee's negligence as an initial matter and put
him to the production of exculpatory evidence if he has any.85 The
owner of an automobile has better means of knowing whether the driver
was in his service when it struck the plaintiff than has the plaintiff. In
such a case also there is an increasingly strong policy to make an auto-
mobile owner pay for the damage it causes even where there is no
agency in the legal sense. Fairness and policy therefore combine to
justify a presumption of agency from the mere fact of ownership. 6
Here, it may be noted, is a presumption (usually created by statute)
in a situation where most courts would not permit an inference.
If there is a presumption operating in proponent's favor when, he
rests his case two questions then arise: (1) .what must the opponent
do to lift the production burden then resting, upon him, and (2) if
the opponent does lift this burden, what if any further effect does the
presumption have?
Let us take up the first of these questions. It can be rephrased in
terms of the simple symbols we have been using. If from A there is a
presumption of B, and A is shown, 7 what must the opponent do to
82.. See, e.g., Sellers v. Quails, 206 Md;'58, 110 A.2d 73 (1954); In re Padjan
Estate, 340 Mich. 277, 65 N.\V2d 743 (1954); In re Jamison's Estate, 41 Cal. 2d 1, 15,
256 P.2d 984, 990 (1953); In re Davis' Will, 14 N.J. 166,.101'A.2d 521 (1953); In re
Frank's' Will, 231 N.C. 252, 259," 56 S.E.2d 668, 674 (1949). But ef. Rice v. Henderson,
1-0 IV Va.-284, 83 S.E.2d 762 (1954)."
83. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485-87 (1895).
84.- See authorities cited note 70 supra.
85. Frissell v. John IV. Rogers, -Inc., 141 Conn. 308, 106 A.2d 162 (1954). See also
James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55 Y,.uE L.J. 365, 392 n.133
(1946); Morgan, Instructing the jury Upon Pres.umption and Burden of Proof, 47
H.kgv. L. Rv. 59, 79 (1933).
SiS.'See:Cebulik v. Levis. 32b Mich. 7f0, 32 N.W.2d 21 (1948); O'Dea v. Amodeo,
118 Conn. 58, 170 At. 486 (1934).
87. Of course the evidence tending to show A may itself fall short- of compelling
such a finding. If so it will be a question for the trier to decide whether A e.ists.
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escape a compulsory finding of B? The answer is that the opponent
must introduce evidence which will justify a finding of, non-B. This
requirement has, to use Maguire's terms, both an extensive and an
intensive aspect.8 To satisfy the extensive aspect, the evidence must
cover the whole of B. Thus a presumption of negligence on the part of
charterers of a vessel turned over to them in good condition and sinking
while in their control, is not met by a showing of care during part of the
time it was in their control.8 9 Such evidence is not enough to lift the
production burden. To satisfy the intensive aspect of the requirement,
the evidence must satisfy the qualitative tests of sufficiency of the evi-
dence to show non-B.
If, now, the opponent has lifted the production burden by rebutting
evidence which satisfies the above standards, what happens to the
presumption? The orthodox view, sired by Thayer, has it that the
presumption is utterly destroyed and disappears, and this even though
the irier disbelieves the countervailing evidence. 90 If, for example, the
addressee of a properly niailed letter testifies that he never received it,
that testimony would, if believed, justify a finding of non-receipt. It
therefore satisfies the test of sufficiency-which is not concerned with
credibility-whether it is believed or not. Under the orthodox view
this testimony would, then, end the presumption even if everybody
in the courtroom was convinced that the testimony was a lie. In the
case put, the destruction of the presumption would not, however, com-
p.I a finding of non-receipt because a properly addressed letter is so
likely to reach its destination that a rational inference may be drawn
The assumption in the text is that the evidence demonstrates A beyond doubt. If it
presents a jury question, what is said in the text is still applicable to the way a jury
will be instructed-i.e., they will be told that if they find A to be established (by a
preponderance of the evidence) then they must also find B. In other words the finding
of B is conditionally compulsory. See MORGAN, MIAG..IRE & VEIN-STEIn, op. Cit. SuIpra
note 67, at 439..
88. AikGuinaa 184.
89. Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 60 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1932);
MAtnMn 184; cf. Frissell v. John V. Rogers, Inc., 141 Conn. 308, 106 A.2d 162 (1954)
(presumption of bailee's negligence arising from re-delivery of goods in damaged
condition, not met by showing they were damaged by fire, without more, since some
fires do result from negligence).
90. THAYEE 346. See Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwvade, 138 Tex. 450," 456, 159
S..V.2d. 854, 857 (1942); Gaudreau. v. Eclipse Pioneer Div. of Bendix Air Corp, 137
N.J.L. 666, 61 A.2d 227. (Ct. Err. &, App. 1948); IORGA-. 77; 9 WimroaE S2491.
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that it id so."' And while countervailing evidence banishes the artificial
procedural effect given by a presumption to the facts proven, A, (in
this case the mailing of the letter, et cetera), yet it does not destroy
the rational probative effect of A. In our illustration, if the trier rejects
the testimony of non-receipt as false and believes the testimony as to
proper mailing, it could and probably would find receipt as an inference
from the mailing. On the suppositions here made, this result seems
just and proper and the orthodox theory would not prevent it. But
there are other situations wherein that view does present serious
problems.
Suppose, first, that the mind of the trier in the case just described is
in equipoise on all the evidence. If the proponent has the burden of
persuading the trier of B's existence, he must lose. Does a presump-
tion of B's existence from proof of A have any effect on the per-
suasion burden? The orthodox doctrine says emphatically not-it
declares that the effect of a presumption is entirely spent in shift-
ing the production burden, and it denies that the persuasion burden
ever shifts.92 But why should this necessarily be so? We have seen
that the considerations which determine the allocation of the persuasion
burden are of the same kind as those which lead to the creation of
presumptions.93 If the developments of a trial bring forth a situation
which justifies a presumption in the proponent's favor, might not the
same considerations (though not necessarily) be sufficient to call for
placing the persuasion burden also on the opponent? 'Why should" a
presumption always have the minimum effect prescribed for it by ortho-
doxy? The reasons that bring it forth will vary from mere administra-
tive convenience, the necessity for getting the ball rolling, so to speak.
to very strong policy.' Should not the force of a presumption "be tough
or tender according to the nature and force of those reasons"? 94 Some
courts say frankly that it should; and that a presumption may some-
times, shift the persuasion burden;95 but on this particular point the
91. See Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, supra note 90, at 456-57, 159
S.V.2d at 857-58; 9 \%ViGMORE §5 2491 (1), 2519.
92. THAYER 370, 378; 9 ,VIGMOaR § 2489.
93. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
94. AIAGUIM 185.
95. Page v. Phelps, 108 Coon. 572, 143 Adt. 890 (1928); Morgan, supra note 85, at
62; see MAGTJI.RE 187; cf. Burr v. Sherwin Wrilliams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041
(1954) (res ipsa loquitur said to raise inference rather than presumption, but -shifts
pcrsuasion burden to defendant" James, Proof of the Breach in Yegligence Cases (In-
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weight:of authority is probably that it may not." This problem is of
importance, but only in cases where the trier's mind is in equipoise
at the end of its deliberations, a situation which probably does not occur
very often.
There is another situation where the orthodox theory gives more
trouble. As we have seen the fact(s), A, which give rise to a presump-
tion of B in many instances are not sufficient to warrant an inference
of B; A familiar example is the fairly common presumption of agency
from the fact of ownership of an automobile. Suppose that Plaintiff,
injured by Owner's automobile driven by Driver, has no available
evidence on the issue of agency except the adverse testimony of Owner
and Driver, and therefore rests on a presumption of agency, ownership
being proven or admitted. Suppose further that Owner, sole defendant,
puts on his own testimony and that of Driver, both of whom deny
agency. If this testimony banishes the presumption, you may have the
anomaly that the trier must find non-agency, even though it thoroughly
disbelieves the denial as self-serving perjury."T Such a result does indeed
offend common sense and justice, and most courts reject it although
it is hard to reconcile its rejection with the orthodox view.9 Once a
presumption comes into play the tendency is to send the matter to
the jury unless the evidence to rebut the presumption leaves no reason-
able room for the jury's function.
If the issue is sent to the jury, the question arises in this situation,
as in the illustration involving the mailing of the letter, whether the
persuasion burden is to be placed on plaintiff or defendant. And here
again most courts will probably put it on plaintiff.99
cluding Res lpsa Loquitur), 37 VA. L. REv. 179, 224 (1951). But ef. Western & Art.
R.R. v. Henderson, 279 US. 639 (1929).
96. See Delaware Coach Co. -. Savage, 81 F. Supp. 293 (D. Del. 1948); Fitz-
simons v. Frey, 153 Neb. 124,.43 N.W.2d 531 (1950); King v. Aird, 251 Ala. 613, 38
So. 2d 883 (1949).
"97. See McIver v. Schwartz, 50 R.I. 68,.145 Ad. 101 (1929).
98. See, e.g., Cebulak v. Lewis, 320 Mich. 710, 32 N.W.2d 21 (1948); Wyckoff v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (1944); O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn.
58, 170 At. 486 (1934).
99. See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724, 729-31 (4th Cir.
1935); authorities cited note 98 supra; 9 NVIG,1ORoE S 2491.
The two alternative views set forth in the text are not the only possible ones, nor
the only ones to attain some judicial support. Morgan, for example,- lists the fol-
lowing: (1) The so-called orthodox view (see note 92 rupra and accompanying text);
(2) a presumption puts on the opponent the burden of persuading the jury "to be-
lieve so much of the evidence against the presumed fact as-would justify- a reasonable
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Another,. diffierent problem has arisen in connection with presump-
tions. If a case goes to the jury, what if anything should be said to the
jury about any presumptions which may have come into the case? The
orthodox answer is unequivocal: nothing..10 If a presumption. has
been met with sufficient evidence, the presumption has vanished and
the issue should go to the jury without mention of it. Of course if
the facts giving rise to the presumption also afford an inference, the
jury may be told about the inference and if the word "presumption"
is used so as to be clearly understood to mean only this permissible
inference, choice of the wrong word may be harmless error.10 1
Even where a court gives a presumption continuing effect after
evidence has been introduced to rebut it, there is no need to mention
the presumption to the jury and it is probably only confusing to do so.
If the persuasion burden is shifted, that is the only burden the instruc-
tions need mention. If it is not, but the jury may find B if they disbelieve
opponent's evidence of non-B, then a simple direction to that effect is
all that is needed. The only justification for telling the jury about the
presumption would be a desire to implement the policy behind the
presumption by inviting the jury to weigh it, in some vague manner not
easy to understand or articulate, as they would a part of the evidence.
But if policy demands additional force to the presumption, better ways
than this can be devised for giving it.
jury in finding against that fact." (3) It disappears when opponent puts in evidence
upon which the trier's mind is in equipoise, if that evidence "is of the requisite
quantity and quality to justify a reasonable jury in finding the nonexistence of the
presumed fact." (4) It puts on opponent "the burden of persuading the jury that the
existence of the presumed fact is so. doubtful that the jury cannot determine whether
it exists" (5) It puts on opponent "the burden of persuading the jury that the pre-
sumed fact does not exist" (6) In addition to having one of the foregoing effects, the
presumption is to be weighed by the jury together uith the evidence in the case. (7)
It may simply allow an inference of B from A when the ordinarv rules of proof
would not allow it. (8) It may compel the finding of B, unconditionally, if A is
found (the conclusive presumption).. Morgan, supra note 85. at 60-62; A list of
possibilities containing fewer refinements is found in O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58.
170 Ad. 486 (1934). See generally MORGA- 81-86.
100. Tm4YER 337-339; 9 WIGMORn § 2491. See also Morgan, supra note 85.
101. See. e.g., Mudrick v. Market St. Ry., 11 Cal. 2d 724, 81 P.2d 950 (1938).
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